Beyond the creditor/debtor divide: the European Unemployment Benefit Scheme

Despite long-lasting debates, no steps have been taken towards the adoption of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme (EUBS).
Traditional political economy literature explains such impasse by looking at the rationale of the political conflict and arguing that a one-dimensional divide between creditor and debtor Member States characterizes the conflict over the implementation of a EUBS. Conversely, this article provides empirical evidence of the existence of a complex "clash syndrome”, i.e. a combination of multiple political tensions of functional and territorial nature.
By focusing on the political debate on the European Parliament report on a budgetary capacity for the Eurozone, this article’s contribution is twofold. Firstly, it sheds light on a still unexplored policy area in the literature on EP party politics, i.e. EMU social integration. Secondly, by analysing the amendments tabled in EP committees, it proposes a new and original methodological approach to investigate the rationale behind MEPs political positioning.